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Implementing India's separation plan
Fourteen thermal power reactors to come under safeguards between 2006 and 2014. U.S. promises to create conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel. |
The CIRUS reactor (at right) within the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Mumbai is to be shut down by 2010. PHOTO: AP
This is the text of the document titled "Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India's Separation Plan" tabled in Parliament on March 7, 2006:
"The resumption of full civilian nuclear energy cooperation between India and the United States arose in the context of India's requirement for adequate and affordable energy supplies to sustain its accelerating economic growth rate and as recognition of its growing technological prowess. It was preceded by discussions between the two Governments, particularly between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, of the global energy scenario and the long-term implications of increasing pressure on hydrocarbon resources and rising oil prices. These developments led to the announcement in April 2005 of an Indo-US Energy Dialogue that encompassed the entire spectrum of energy options ranging from oil and gas to coal, alternative fuels and civilian nuclear energy. Through the initiation of a sustained dialogue to address energy security concerns, the two countries sought to promote stable, efficient, predictable and cost effective solutions for India's growing requirements. At the same time, they also agreed on the need to develop and deploy cleaner, more efficient, affordable and diversified energy technologies to deal with the environmental implications of energy consumption. India had developed proven and wide-ranging capabilities in the nuclear sector, including over the entire nuclear fuel cycle. It is internationally recognized that India has unique contributions to make to international efforts towards meeting these objectives. India has become a full partner in ITER, with the full support of the US and other partners. India also accepted the US invitation to join the initiative on Clean Development Partnership.
U.S. undertaking
"2. Noting the centrality of civilian nuclear energy to the twin challenges of energy security and safeguarding the environment, the two Governments agreed on 18 July 2005 to undertake reciprocal commitments and responsibilities that would create a framework for the resumption of full cooperation in this field. On its part, the United States undertook to:
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Seek agreement from the Congress to adjust US laws and policies to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation.
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Work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.
In the meantime, encourage its partners to consider fuel supply to Tarapur expeditiously.
To consult with its partners to consider India's participation in ITER.
To consult with other participants in the Generation-IV International Forum with a view towards India's inclusion.
"3. India had conveyed its readiness to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. Accordingly, India for its part undertook the following commitments:
Identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner.
Filing a declaration regarding its civilian facilities with the IAEA.
Taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and
Signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities.
"4. Other commitments undertaken by India have already been fulfilled in the last year. Among them are:
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India's responsible non-proliferation record, recognized by the US, continues and is reflected in its policies and actions.
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The harmonization of India's export controls with NSG [Nuclear Suppliers' Group] and MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] Guidelines even though India is not a member of either group. These guidelines and control lists have been notified and are being implemented.
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A significant upgrading of India's non-proliferation regulations and export controls has taken place as a result of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of May 2005. Inter-Ministerial consultations are ongoing to examine and amend other relevant Acts as well as framing appropriate rules and regulations.
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Refrain from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread. This has guided our policy on non-proliferation.
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Continued unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, and
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Willingness to work with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
"5. The Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, recognized that India is ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. India has an impeccable record in non-proliferation. The Joint Statement acknowledges that India's nuclear programme has both a military and a civilian component. Both sides had agreed that the purpose was not to constrain India's strategic programme but to enable resumption of full civil nuclear energy cooperation in order to enhance global energy and environmental security. Such cooperation was predicated on the assumption that any international civil nuclear energy cooperation (including by the U.S.) offered to India in the civilian sector should, firstly, not be diverted away from civilian purposes, and secondly, should not be transferred from India to third countries without safeguards. These concepts will be reflected in the Safeguards Agreement to be negotiated by India with IAEA.
"6. India's nuclear programme is unique as it is the only state with nuclear weapons not to have begun with a dedicated military programme. It must be appreciated that the strategic programme is an offshoot of research on nuclear power programme and consequently, it is embedded in a larger undifferentiated programme. Identification of purely civilian facilities and programmes that have no strategic implications poses a particular challenge. Therefore, facilities identified as civilian in the Separation Plan will be offered for safeguards in phases to be decided by India. The nature of the facility concerned, the activities undertaken in it, the national security significance of materials and the location of the facilities are factors taken into account in undertaking the separation process. This is solely an Indian determination.
Three-stage programme
"7.The nuclear establishment in India not only built nuclear reactors but promoted the growth of a national industrial infrastructure. Nuclear power generation was envisaged as a three-stage programme with PHWRs [pressurised heavy water reactors] chosen for deployment in the first stage. As indigenous reactors were set up, several innovative design improvements were carried out based on Indian R&D and a standardized design was evolved. The research and technology development spanned the entire spectrum of the nuclear fuel cycle including the front end and the back end. Success in the technologies for the back end of the fuel cycle allowed us to launch the second stage of the programme by constructing a Fast Breeder Test Reactor. This reactor has operated for 20 years based on a unique carbide fuel and has achieved all technology objectives. We have now proceeded further and are constructing a 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor. Simultaneously, we have launched design and development of reactors aimed at thorium utilization and incorporating inherent safety features.
"8.Concepts such as grid connectivity are not relevant to the separation exercise. Issues related to fuel resource sustainability, technical design and economic viability, as well as smooth operation of reactors are relevant factors. This would necessitate grid connectivity irrespective of whether the reactor concerned is civilian or not civilian.
"9.It must be recognized that the Indian nuclear programme still has a relatively narrow base and cannot be expected to adopt solutions that might be deemed viable by much larger programmes. A comparison of the number of reactors and the total installed capacity between India and the P-5 brings this out graphically [see table].
"10. Another factor to be taken into account is the small capacity of the reactors produced indigenously by India, some of which would remain outside safeguards. Therefore, in assessing the extent of safeguards coverage, it would be important to look at both the number of reactors and the percentage of installed capacity covered. An average Indian reactor is of 220 MW and its output is significantly smaller than the standards reactor in a P-5 economy [see table].
"11. The complexity of the separation process is further enhanced by the limited resources that India has devoted to its nuclear programme as compared to P-5 nations. Moreover, as India expands international cooperation, the percentage of its thermal power reactor installed capacity under safeguards would rise significantly as fresh capacity is added through such cooperation.
"12. India's approach to the separation of its civilian nuclear facilities is guided by the following principles:
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Credible, feasible and implementable in a transparent manner;
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Consistent with the understandings of the 18 July Statement;
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Consistent with India's national security and R&D requirements as well as not prejudicial to the three-stage nuclear programme in India;
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Must be cost effective in its implementation; and
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Must be acceptable to Parliament and public opinion.
"13. Based on these principles, India will:
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Include in the civilian list only those facilities offered for safeguards that, after separation, will no longer be engaged in activities of strategic significance.
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The overarching criterion would be a judgment whether subjecting a facility to IAEA safeguards would impact adversely on India's national security.
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However, a facility will be excluded from the civilian list if it is located in a larger hub of strategic significance, notwithstanding the fact that it may not be normally engaged in activities of strategic significance.
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A civilian facility would, therefore, be one that India has determined not to be relevant to its strategic programme.
"14. Taking the above into account, India, on the basis of reciprocal actions by the US, will adopt the following approach:
"(i) Thermal Power Reactors: India will identify and offer for safeguards 14 thermal power reactors between 2006 and 2014. This will include the 4 presently safeguarded reactors (TAPS 1&2, RAPS 1&2) and in addition KK 1&2 that are under construction. 8 other PHWRs, each of a capacity of 220 MW, will also be offered. Phasing of specific thermal power reactors, being offered for safeguards would be indicated separately by India. Such an offer would, in effect, cover 14 out of the 22 thermal power reactors in operation or currently under construction to be placed under safeguards, and would raise the total installed Thermal Power capacity by MWs under safeguards from the present 19% to 65% by 2014.
"(ii) Fast Breeder Reactors: India is not in a position to accept safeguards on the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), both located at Kalpakkam. The Fast Breeder Programme is at the R&D stage and its technology will take time to mature and reach an advanced stage of development.
"(iii) Future Reactors: India has decided to place under safeguards all future civilian thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the Government of India retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian.
"(iv) Research Reactors: India will permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor, in 2010. It will also be prepared to shift the fuel core of the APSARA reactor that was purchased from France outside BARC [Bhabha Atomic Research Centre] and make the fuel core available to be placed under safeguards in 2010.
"(v) Upstream facilities: The following upstream facilities would be identified and separated as civilian:
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List of those specific facilities in the Nuclear Fuel Complex, which will be offered for safeguards by 2008 will be indicated separately.
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The Heavy Water Production plants at Thal, Tuticorin and Hazira are proposed to be designated for civilian use between 2006-2009. We do not consider these plants as relevant for safeguards purposes.
"(vi) Downstream facilities: The following downstream facilities would be identified and separated as civilian:
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India is willing to accept safeguards in the `campaign' mode after 2010 in respect of the Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant.
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The Tarapur and Rajasthan `Away From Reactors' spent fuel storage pools would be made available for safeguards with appropriate phasing between 2006-2009.
"(vii) Research Facilities: India will declare the following facilities as civilian:
"(a) Tata Institute of Fundamental Research
"(b) Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre
"(c) Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics
"(d) Institute for Plasma Research
"(e) Institute of Mathematics Sciences
"(f) Institute of Physics
"(g) Tata Memorial Centre
"(h) Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology
"(i) Harish Chandra Research Institute
"These facilities are safeguards-irrelevant. It is our expectation that they will play a prominent role in international cooperation.
15. Safeguards:
"(a) The United States has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel to India. Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the U.S. Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations.
"(b) To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is prepared to take the following additional steps:
"(i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the U.S. Congress.
"(ii) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement.
"(iii) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.
"(iv) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.
"(c) In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.
"16. This plan is in conformity with the commitments made to Parliament by the Government."
No curb on nuclear facilities: Manmohan
Special Correspondent
Sees no adverse effect from India-United States deal and separation plan |
"The integrity of our nuclear doctrine and our ability to sustain a Minimum Credible Nuclear Deterrent is protected"
CIRUS reactor shutdown in 2010
NEW DELHI: Asserting that India's ability to sustain a minimum credible nuclear deterrent remains adequately protected, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Tuesday assured Parliament that the India-U.S. nuclear deal and the `Separation Plan' of civil and military nuclear facilities will not adversely affect the country's strategic programme.
In identical statements in both Houses of Parliament, the Prime Minister said no constraint has been placed on India's right to construct new facilities for strategic purposes.
"The integrity of our Nuclear Doctrine and our ability to sustain a minimum credible nuclear deterrent is adequately protected," Dr. Singh said.
The Prime Minister announced that the CIRUS (Canadian-Indian-U.S.) reactor would be permanently shut down in 2010. The fuel core of the Apsara reactor was purchased from France and the Government was ready to shift it from its present location and make it available for placing under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in 2010.
Both CIRUS and Apsara reactors are located at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). "We have decided to take these steps rather than allow intrusive inspections in a nuclear facility of high national security importance. We are determined that such steps will not hinder ongoing research and development." In his 25-minute suo motu statement on `Discussions on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States: Implementation of India's Separation Plan,' Dr. Singh outlined the salient elements of the Separation Plan, dwelt on the additional steps to be taken by the U.S. to guard against any disruption of fuel supplies to India and stressed the need to ensure energy security for the future.
Dr. Singh said the Separation Plan does not come in the way of the integrity of India's three-stage nuclear programme, including future use of the country's thorium reserves.
Prime Minister's Suo Motu Statement on Discussions on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the US: Implementation of India's Separation Plan
March 7, 2006 New Delhi
In my Statement on February 27, 2006, I had provided an assurance that this august House will be informed of developments in our discussions with the United States on separation of our civilian and military nuclear facilities. I now inform this august House of developments since my suo motu statement of 27 February.
The President of the United States, His Excellency Mr. George W. Bush visited India between March 1-3, 2006. His visit provided our two countries an opportunity to review progress made in deepening our strategic partnership since the Joint Statement issued during my visit to Washington last July. Our discussions covered the expansion of our ties in the fields of agriculture, economic and trade cooperation, energy security and clean environment, strengthening innovation and the knowledge economy, issues relating to global safety and security and on deepening democracy. Expanded cooperation in each of these areas will have a significant impact on India's social and economic development. The full text of the Joint Statement issued during President Bush's visit is placed on the Table of the House.
I have pleasure in informing the House that during President Bush's visit, as part of the process of promoting cooperation in civilian nuclear energy, agreement was reached between India and the United States on a Separation Plan. Accordingly, India will identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and place its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Sir, I place on the Table of the House the Separation Plan that has been drawn up by India and agreed between India and the United States in implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005.
I would like to outline some salient elements of the Separation Plan:
i) India will identify and offer for IAEA safeguards 14 thermal power reactors between 2006-14. There are 22 thermal power reactors in operation or currently under construction in the country. Fourteen of these will be placed under safeguards by 2014 in a phased manner. This would raise the total installed thermal power capacity in Megawatts under safeguards from 19% at present to 65% by 2014. I wish to emphasize that the choice of specific nuclear reactors and the phases in which they would be placed under safeguards is an Indian decision. We are preparing a list of 14 reactors that would be offered for safeguards between 2006-14.
ii) We have conveyed that India will not accept safeguards on the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), both located at Kalpakkam. The Fast Breeder Programme is at the R&D stage. This technology will take time to mature and reach an advanced stage of development. We do not wish to place any encumbrances on our Fast Breeder programme, and this has been fully ensured in the Separation Plan.
(iii) India has decided to place under safeguards all future civilian thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the Government of India retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian. This means that India will not be constrained in any way in building future nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military, as per our national requirements.
(iv) India has decided to permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor, in 2010. The fuel core of the Apsara reactor was purchased from France, and we are prepared to shift it from its present location and make it available for placing under safeguards in 2010. Both CIRUS and Apsara are located at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre. We have decided to take these steps rather than allow intrusive inspections in a nuclear facility of high national security importance. We are determined that such steps will not hinder ongoing Research and Development.
(v) Reprocessing and enrichment capabilities and other facilities associated with the fuel cycle for our strategic programme have been kept out of the Separation Plan.
(vi) One of the major points addressed in the Separation Plan was the need to ensure reliability of fuel supplies, given our unfortunate past experience with regard to interruption in supply of fuel for Tarapur. We have received commitments from the United States for the reliable supply of fuel to India for reactors that will be offered for safeguards. The United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for such reactors. Under the July 18 Joint Statement, the United States is committed to seeking agreement from its Congress to amend domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international market for nuclear fuel, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations. This has been reflected in the formal understandings reached during the visit and included in the Separation Plan.
(vii) To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies for India, the United States is prepared to take other additional steps, such as :
a) Incorporating assurances regarding fuel supply in a bilateral U.S.?India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy which would be negotiated.
b) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement.
c) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.
d) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.
In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA. In essence, an India-specific safeguards agreement would provide: on the one hand safeguards against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time, and on the other permit India to take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA. In the terms of the Separation plan, there is hence assurance of uninterrupted supply of fuel to reactors that would be placed under safeguards together with India's right to take corrective measures in the event fuel supplies are interrupted. The House can rest assured that India retains its sovereign right to take all appropriate measures to fully safeguard its interests.
During my Suo Motu Statements on this subject made on July 29, 2005 and on February 27, 2006, I had given a solemn assurance to this august House and through the Honorable members to the country, that the Separation Plan will not adversely effect our country's national security. I am in a position to assure the Members that that this is indeed the case. I might mention:
i) That the separation plan will not adversely effect our strategic programme. There will be no capping of our strategic programme, and the separation plan ensures adequacy of fissile material and other inputs to meet the current and future requirements of our strategic programme, based on our assessment of the threat scenarios. No constraint has been placed on our right to construct new facilities for strategic purposes. The integrity of our Nuclear Doctrine and our ability to sustain a Minimum Credible Nuclear Deterrent is adequately protected. Our nuclear policy will continue to be guided by the principles of restraint and responsibility.
ii) The Separation Plan does not come in the way of the integrity of our three stage nuclear programme, including the future use of our thorium reserves. The autonomy of our Research and Development activities in the nuclear field will remain unaffected. The Fast Breeder Test Reactor and the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor remain outside safeguards. We have agreed, however, that future civilian Thermal power reactors and civilian Fast Breeder Reactors would be placed under safeguards, but the determination of what is civilian is solely an Indian decision.
As I mentioned in my Statement on February 27, the Separation Plan has been very carefully drawn up after an intensive internal consultation process overseen by my Office. The Department of Atomic Energy and our nuclear scientific community have been associated with the preparation of the Separation Plan. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Principal Scientific Adviser to the Government of India were actively involved closely at every stage. I am in a position to assure the Hon'ble members that we have not permitted information of national security significance to be compromised in any way during the negotiations.
I believe that the significance of the July 18, 2005 Statement is the prospect it offers for ending India's nuclear isolation. It will open up prospects for cooperation not only with the US but with countries like Russia, France and other countries with advanced nuclear capabilities, including those from the NSG. The scope for cooperation in the energy related research will vastly expand, so will cooperation in nuclear research activities. India will be able to join the international mainstream and occupy its rightful place among the top countries of the nuclear community. There would be a quantum jump in our energy generating capacity with a consequential impact on our GDP growth. It also ensures India's participation as a full partner in cutting edge multilateral scientific effort in the nuclear field such as ITER and Generation IV Initiative.
Sir, successful implementation of the July 18 Joint Statement requires reciprocal actions by the United States as well as India. Steps to be taken by India will be contingent upon actions taken by the US. For our part, we have prepared a Separation Plan that identifies those civilian facilities that we are willing to offer for safeguards. The United States Government has accepted this Separation Plan. It now intends to approach the US Congress for amending its laws and the Nuclear Suppliers Group for adapting its Guidelines to enable full civilian cooperation between India and the international community. At the appropriate stage, India will approach the IAEA to discuss and fashion an India-specific safeguards agreement, which will reflect the unique character of this arrangement. Since such a safeguards agreement is yet to be negotiated it will be difficult to predict its content, but I can assure the House that we will not accept any provisions that go beyond the parameters of the July 18, 2005 Statement and the Separation Plan agreed between India and the United States, on March 2, 2006.We are hopeful that this process will move forward in the coming weeks and months.
I would request Hon'ble Members to look at this matter through the larger perspective of energy security. Currently, nuclear energy provides only three per cent of our total energy mix. Rising costs and reliability of imported hydrocarbon supplies constitute a major uncertainty at a time when we are accelerating our growth rate. We must endeavor to expand our capabilities across the entire energy spectrum ? from clean coal and coal-bed methane, to gas hydrates and wind and solar power. We are actively seeking international partnerships across the board and are members of many international initiatives dedicated to energy. Indeed, at the end of my talks with President Bush, we announced Indian participation in two more programmes: the Future-Gen programme for zero emission thermal power plants and the Integrated Ocean Drilling Programme for gas hydrates.
The House will appreciate that the search for an integrated policy with an appropriate mix of energy supplies is central to the achievement of our broader economic or social objectives. Energy is the lifeblood of our economy. Without sufficient and predictable access, our aspirations in the social sector cannot be realized. Inadequate power has a deleterious effect in building a modern infrastructure. It has a direct impact on the optimal usage of increasingly scarce water resources. Power shortage is thus not just a handicap in one sector but a drag on the entire economy.
I believe that the needs of the people of India must become the central agenda for our international cooperation. It is precisely this approach that has guided our growing partnership with the United States. I would, in particular, draw attention to the launching of the Knowledge Initiative in Agriculture with a three year financial commitment to link our universities and technical institutions and businesses to support agricultural education, research, capacity building, including in the area of bio-technology. Our first Green Revolution benefited in substantial measure from assistance provided by the US. We are hopeful that the Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture will become the harbinger of a second Green Revolution in our country.
Sir, India and the United States have much to gain from this new partnership. This was the main underlying theme of our discussions during the visit of President Bush. The resumption of civilian nuclear energy cooperation would demonstrate that we have entered a new and more positive phase of our ties, so that we can finally put behind us years of troubled relations in the nuclear field. I am confident that this is a worthy objective that will receive the full support of this House.
India, Australia to discuss uranium supply issue
Amit Baruah
No intention now to change policy, says John Howard |
STRIKING A RAPPORT: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh receives his Australian counterpart, John Howard, at the Rashtrapati Bhavan in New Delhi on Monday. — Photo: V.V. Krishnan
NEW DELHI: India and Australia have agreed that a group of officials will discuss a possible supply of uranium to New Delhi. Canberra has, however, ruled out any immediate change in its stand — not supplying uranium to countries which are not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
"We don't alter policy at press conferences," the visiting Prime Minister, John Howard, said after talks with his Indian counterpart, Manmohan Singh, at Hyderabad House here on Monday. The two leaders witnessed the signing of six agreements, including one accord on defence cooperation.
Earlier, Reuters quoted Mr. Howard as having said: "We do have a long-standing policy of selling uranium only to countries that are part of the NPT regime, but we will have a look at what the Americans have done [with the Indians] and when we get a bit more information about that we'll further assess it."
"Australia does have large supplies of uranium ... and provided the rules are followed and the safeguards are met, we are willing to sell, but we have to be satisfied about safeguards," Mr. Howard said late on Sunday.
Asked about those remarks, he said on Monday there was no "current intention" of changing the policy. "We are, however, interested in what the Americans and the Indians have agreed to. There are a lot of good things about that agreement ... in particular for the first time India's civilian nuclear facilities will come under international inspections. But the Indian-American agreement in itself is no reason for us to change our policy and I have said that, Mr. Downer has said it, but we will listen to what the Indians have said ... "
"We're short of uranium"
Speaking at the Rashtrapati Bhavan, Dr. Singh said: "We would very much like Australia to sell uranium to India."
Earlier, in an interview to an Australian newspaper, he said: "I hope Australia will be an important partner in this. We are short of uranium. We need to import uranium and our needs will increase in the years to come.
"I very much hope that Australia, as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, would endorse what I and President Bush have worked out. This is an arrangement, which helps the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. India has an impeccable record of not entering into any unauthorised arms proliferation," he said.
Australia, with 29 per cent of the world's medium-cost uranium reserves, operates three mines.
Australia has a special problem since it supplies uranium to non-nuclear weapon states or nuclear weapon states. India does not fit into either category under the NPT. For nuclear weapon states, Australian uranium must be covered under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
No nuclear deal with Pakistan
B. Muralidhar Reddy
Says President Bush: Islamabad needs to do a lot more to defeat the Al-Qaeda |
ISLAMABAD: United States President George W. Bush on Saturday sent out a clear message that Pakistan had to do "a lot of work" to defeat the terrorist outfit, Al-Qaeda. He ruled out forging with Islamabad an accord similar to the civilian nuclear deal Washington clinched with New Delhi.
On a 24-hour visit here, Mr. Bush reiterated gently but firmly the U.S. concerns vis-à-vis Pakistan about terrorism, proliferation and democracy.
In response to Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's plea for facilitation on Kashmir, Mr. Bush said the best way of resolving the issue was through dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad.
Alternative to radicalism
At a joint press conference with Gen. Musharraf after two hours of talks, the U.S. President repeatedly talked about the threat posed by terrorists. He said Gen. Musharraf envisioned a modern state, which provided an alternative to radicalism.
"There's a variety of things we can continue to cooperate on. Perhaps the most important one of all is to defeat these terrorists, some of whom are lodged here in Pakistan, some of whom have tried to kill your President. And close cooperation is needed to defeat them," Mr. Bush said in response to a question.
Gen. Musharraf talked about the difference between terrorism and extremism and the need for a strategy to tackle both. "Then we need to strategise... We have strategised on how to deal with terrorism, and then strategised also on how to deal with extremism, which is very different from terrorism. So we have strategised both. Then we need to come to the implementation part."
Mr. Bush took political and diplomatic circles by surprise, saying part of his mission to Pakistan was to "determine whether or not the President is as committed as he has been in the past to bringing these terrorists to justice, and he is." Asked what more the U.S. expected him to do in the war against terrorism, Mr. Bush said Gen. Musharraf understood the stakes, responsibility and "the need to make sure our strategy is able to defeat the enemy."
Mr. Bush said Pakistan was an important partner in the fight against proliferation and it agreed to join the Container Security Initiative, an international effort to stop the spread of dangerous material shipments. "We'll continue to work together to ensure that the world's most dangerous weapons do not end up in the hands of the terrorists."
Elaborating why Washington was not looking at the option of extending the nuclear deal with Islamabad, he said India and Pakistan were two different countries with "different needs and histories." U.S. Secretary of Energy Sam Bodman would soon be in the region to work with the Pakistan Government on the country's energy needs.
To a question on the Iran gas pipeline, Mr. Bush said, "Our beef with Iran is not the pipeline; our beef with Iran is the fact that they want to develop a nuclear weapon. And I believe a nuclear weapon in the hands of the Iranians would be very dangerous for all of us. It would endanger world peace. So we're working very hard to convince the Iranians to get rid of their nuclear ambitions."
In his opening remarks, Gen. Musharraf said he had expressed during his talks with Mr. Bush Pakistan's deepest regret over the killing of a U.S. diplomat in Karachi on Thursday.
Gen. Musharraf emphasised the strategic partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan and said Saturday's meeting laid the foundations for a very strong, sustainable, broad-based and a long-term relationship.
He said the U.S.-Pakistan strategic dialogue would be institutionalised, creating a framework to look at cooperation in trade and investment, defence, education and in the fight against terrorism.
Australia will not supply uranium till India signs NPT
K. Venugopal
Canberra: Australia will not supply natural uranium to India as long as it does not sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), Alexander Downer, Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs, said in an interview here on Wednesday. He was responding to a question whether Australia saw a role for itself as a supplier of uranium to India in the event of the United States and India coming to an agreement that would help lift international sanctions on the Indian nuclear energy programme.
Speaking to a couple of visiting Indian journalists ahead of Prime Minister John Howard's trip to New Delhi next week, Mr. Downer recalled that the foundation of his country's policy on nuclear supplies was that it would export uranium only to countries that had signed the treaty. Since India had not signed the NPT, and was not going to do so soon, the export could not happen.
Nevertheless, the Australian Foreign Minister was appreciative of recent proposals emanating from India.
"Some of the proposals put forward by India, even if they do not amount to signing the NPT but only adhering to the transparency of the regime, may not be optimal but that is a step in the right direction," he remarked.
A big exporter
Endowed with 40 per cent of the world's cheaply extractable uranium, Australia is a big exporter of the mineral. In recent weeks, it has been negotiating a long-term contract for supplies to China, which is embarking on a large expansion of its nuclear power capacity. China is a signatory to the NPT as a nuclear weapon state.
INDO - US JOINT STATEMENT
The following is the text of Indo-US Joint Statement issued after the delegation-level meeting between the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh and the US President Mr. George W. Bush, in Washington DC on July 18, 2005.
"Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush today declare their resolve to transform the relationship between their countries and establish a global partnership. As leaders of nations committed to the values of human freedom, democracy and rule of law, the new relationship between India and the United States will promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace throughout the world. It will enhance our ability to work together to provide global leadership in areas of mutual concern and interest.
Building on their common values and interests, the two leaders resolve:
· To create an international environment conducive to promotion of democratic values, and to strengthen democratic practices in societies which wish to become more open and pluralistic.
· To combat terrorism relentlessly. They applaud the active and vigorous counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries and support more international efforts in this direction. Terrorism is a global scourge and the one we will fight everywhere. The two leaders strongly affirm their commitment to the conclusion by September of a UN comprehensive convention against international terrorism.
The Prime Minister's visit coincides with the completion of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative, launched in January 2004. The two leaders agree that this provides the basis for expanding bilateral activities and commerce in space, civil nuclear energy and dual-use technology.
Drawing on their mutual vision for the U.S.-India relationship, and our joint objectives as strong long-standing democracies, the two leaders agree on the following:
FOR THE ECONOMY
· Revitalize the U.S.-India Economic Dialogue and launch a CEO Forum to harness private sector energy and ideas to deepen the bilateral economic relationship.
· Support and accelerate economic growth in both countries through greater trade, investment, and technology collaboration.
· Promote modernization of India's infrastructure as a prerequisite for the continued growth of the Indian economy. As India enhances its investment climate, opportunities for investment will increase.
· Launch a U.S.-India Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture focused on promoting teaching, research, service and commercial linkages.
FOR ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
· Strengthen energy security and promote the development of stable and efficient energy markets in India with a view to ensuring adequate, affordable energy supplies and conscious of the need for sustainable development. These issues will be addressed through the U.S.-India Energy Dialogue.
· Agree on the need to promote the imperatives of development and safeguarding the environment, commit to developing and deploying cleaner, more efficient, affordable, and diversified energy technologies.
FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT
· Develop and support, through the new U.S.-India Global Democracy Initiative in countries that seek such assistance, institutions and resources that strengthen the foundations that make democracies credible and effective. India and the U.S. will work together to strengthen democratic practices and capacities and contribute to the new U.N. Democracy Fund.
· Commit to strengthen cooperation and combat HIV/AIDS at a global level through an initiative that mobilizes private sector and government resources, knowledge, and expertise.
FOR NON-PROLIFERATION AND SECURITY
· Express satisfaction at the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship as a basis for future cooperation, including in the field of defense technology.
· Commit to play a leading role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The U.S. welcomed the adoption by India of legislation on WMD (Prevention of Unlawful Activities Bill).
· Launch a new U.S.-India Disaster Relief Initiative that builds on the experience of the Tsunami Core Group, to strengthen cooperation to prepare for and conduct disaster relief operations.
FOR HIGH-TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE
· Sign a Science and Technology Framework Agreement, building on the U.S.-India High-Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), to provide for joint research and training, and the establishment of public-private partnerships.
· Build closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena through mechanisms such as the U.S.-India Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation.
· Building on the strengthened non-proliferation commitments undertaken in the NSSP, to remove certain Indian organizations from the Department of Commerce's Entity List.
Recognizing the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner, the two leaders discussed India's plans to develop its civilian nuclear energy program.
President Bush conveyed his appreciation to the Prime Minister over India's strong commitment to preventing WMD proliferation and stated that as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states. The President told the Prime Minister that he will work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it realizes its goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security. The President would also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies, and the United States will work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur. In the meantime, the United States will encourage its partners to also consider this request expeditiously. India has expressed its interest in ITER and a willingness to contribute. The United States will consult with its partners considering India's participation. The United States will consult with the other participants in the Generation IV International Forum with a view toward India's inclusion.
The Prime Minister conveyed that for his part, India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. These responsibilities and practices consist of identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities; continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread; and ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.
The President welcomed the Prime Minister's assurance. The two leaders agreed to establish a working group to undertake on a phased basis in the months ahead the necessary actions mentioned above to fulfill these commitments. The President and Prime Minister also agreed that they would review this progress when the President visits India in 2006.
The two leaders also reiterated their commitment that their countries would play a leading role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.
In light of this closer relationship, and the recognition of India's growing role in enhancing regional and global security, the Prime Minister and the President agree that international institutions must fully reflect changes in the global scenario that have taken place since 1945. The President reiterated his view that international institutions are going to have to adapt to reflect India's central and growing role. The two leaders state their expectations that India and the United States will strengthen their cooperation in global forums.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh thanks President Bush for the warmth of his reception and the generosity of his hospitality. He extends an invitation to President Bush to visit India at his convenience and the President accepts that invitation."
India-U.S. Nuclear Accord `Has Support' in House (Update2)
By Viola Gienger and Laura Litvan
Sept. 11 (Bloomberg) -- A nuclear-energy agreement with India has support in the U.S. House of Representatives, Speaker Nancy Pelosi said today, adding she hopes ``work can be done'' to bring it to a vote.
President George W. Bush submitted the accord to Congress last night, saying it meets the terms set by a law passed almost two years ago and poses no risk to security. Lawmakers first must agree to waive a requirement that Congress, which is due to adjourn Sept. 26, be in session 30 consecutive days to consider the agreement.
``I hope that that work can be done so that we can take it up,'' Pelosi told reporters in Washington today. While the agreement ``does have support in the House,'' it must ``honor the principles of'' legislation Congress passed in December 2006 to lay the groundwork for negotiating the terms, she said.
The Bush administration is racing to win ratification of the agreement before Congress adjourns, after Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh put his government on the line for it. Singh will meet with Bush at the White House on Sept. 25 to discuss U.S.- India issues, Bush spokeswoman Dana Perino said today.
While a group of nuclear-supplier nations last week granted a waiver for India to engage in trade of nuclear fuel and supplies, U.S. companies need congressional approval to participate.
Committee Vote
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joe Biden, the Democratic vice presidential running mate for candidate Barack Obama, has backed the agreement. Biden would help determine whether the measure gets a vote by the full Senate.
``I am pleased the president has submitted'' the accord to Congress, Biden said today in a statement. ``The Foreign Relations Committee will act promptly to review the agreement in a hearing, as soon as next week.''
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid will work with Biden and Republican leaders to bring the agreement to a vote by the full chamber, Jim Manley, a spokesman for the Nevada Democrat, said yesterday.
``Senator Reid indicated that he would try to find a way to move it forward,'' said Manley.
Companies including General Electric Co. want a shot at selling atomic fuel and technology to an economy that needs to power growth of more than 8 percent annually since 2003. The country of 1.1 billion people may spend $100 billion or more to meet its energy demands.
Peaceful Cooperation
``The proposed agreement provides a comprehensive framework for U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation with India,'' Bush said in a statement issued late yesterday. The accord ``will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.''
The negotiated terms meet all requirements of the 1954 U.S. Atomic Energy Act except one, Bush said. The accord doesn't condition continued U.S. supply of atomic fuel to India on the International Atomic Energy Agency's ability to conduct safety inspections of all nuclear materials.
India will submit only its civilian reactors to IAEA safeguards, not its military program.
``The agreement will reinforce the growing bilateral relationship between two vibrant democracies,'' Bush said in his statement. The U.S. is ``committed to a strategic partnership with India.''
Economic Benefits
Civil nuclear cooperation will offer major strategic and economic benefits to both countries, Bush said. He cited improved energy security, more access to an ``environmentally friendly'' power source, greater economic opportunities, and ``more robust non-proliferation efforts.''
Singh and Bush first signed the outlines of the trade accord in 2005. Officials negotiated the specific terms last year.
Congress laid the groundwork for the agreement with passage of the Hyde Act in December 2006, setting hurdles that must be overcome before the House and Senate give it final approval.
Pelosi made clear that the India agreement shouldn't set a precedent, saying stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is a ``pillar'' of U.S. national security.
``What we do in India has to be seen, I think, in the context of a managed situation that does not send a message that it's okay to proceed to a more nuclear state,'' Pelosi said.
Nuclear Tests
Lawmakers and arms-control advocates have been concerned that the U.S. is pledging to continue supplying India with nuclear fuel even if it conducts another atomic test, a practice that prompted its isolation in the first place. Bush said in his letter that the accord doesn't ``transform these political commitments into legally binding commitments.''
Among the standards set, Bush must certify that India has met requirements such as gaining the approval of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and submitting a list of atomic plants for civilian energy use that will be subject to safeguards inspections by the Vienna-based IAEA.
``We've got to look at the details because there are going to be some problems'' in the package sent to the House, said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association.
India hadn't submitted the list as of Sept. 7 and didn't plan to until after the U.S. agreement goes forward and contracts with companies are negotiated, Kimball said in a telephone interview before the package was submitted to Congress.
Arms-control advocates are fighting passage without stricter standards for India, citing its status as one of only three countries that never signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. India wants to retain the right to develop nuclear weapons.
``Given India's history of violating its peaceful nuclear use agreements to build nuclear weapons, India's promises provide little confidence,'' Kimball said.
India is seeking nuclear energy agreements with France and Russia while it awaits congressional approval of the accord, the Foreign Ministry said in New Delhi today.
To contact the reporters on this story: Viola Gienger in Washington at vgienger@bloomberg.net; Laura Litvan in Washington at llitvan@bloomberg.net
Communist parties ask Indian govt to reject 123 Agreement
* Say accord 'no different from Tarapur agreement'
* Say pact will in no way bind US as nuclear supplier
By Iftikhar Gilani
NEW DELHI: Indian Communist parties on Wednesday asked the government to reject the 123 Agreement compassing the nuclear deal with the United States, asserting that it was "no different from the earlier Tarapur agreement, where the right of the US to terminate the agreement has remained unfettered".
A statement issued by the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) said now was the right time for Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh to fulfill "his pledge to the nation that he will walk away from the nuclear deal if it did not meet India's expectations".
The statement said the documents filed by US President George W Bush with the US Congress had made it clear that the terms of the 123 Agreement conformed with the Hyde Act, violating crucial commitments made by Dr Singh in parliament.
It said that US consent to India reprocessing spent fuel was 'programmatic' and identical to the clause in the Tarapur agreement, where the US had unilaterally terminated its consent, forcing India to hold the spent fuel.
Will not bind:
The statement said the Indian government flaunting a different interpretation to the agreement was 'meaningless', as it would in no way bind the US as a supplier. "The US as a supplier of nuclear equipment and materials will undertake such supply only under the terms of what it calls a framework agreement," said the statement.
It said Bush had not only denied any legal binding on perpetual fuel supply, but had also made it clear that India's facilities and materials would be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in perpetuity. It claimed that the US had also failed to define the quantity of nuclear material transfer, so that it was not obliged to help India build up adequate fuel reserves for lifetime operation of the reactors.
Iran issue:
The CPI-M statement also said that the US had tied extraneous issues to the nuclear deal, adding that the report to the US Congress approvingly talked about India aligning with the US on the Iran issue both in the IAEA and the UN.
It said the report even claimed that India "maintained a strong public line of support for the P5+1 statement and US diplomatic efforts to resolve international concerns with Iran's nuclear programme". The statement said the report contradicted India's earlier position that it supported Iran's right to nuclear fuel.
It said the issue of nuclear weapons and the right to enrichment were two separate issues, and criticised Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee's recent statement formally changing India's position and opposing fuel enrichment, a right that Iran possessed under Article IV of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The party also asserted that India had pledged unilateral adherence to the Missile Technology Control (MTCR) regime of which it was not a part. It quoted the Report Pursuant to Section 104 (C) of the Hyde Act that India had written a letter stating its "adherence to the MTCR and its annex in a letter dated September, 9, 2008, to Mr Jacques Audibert, the MTCR point of contact in Paris".
Eight objections:
The statement also reiterated the left parties' eight objections to the nuclear deal, that now stand confirmed in the documents before the US Congress. These are:
* India will not have any uninterrupted fuel supply assurance;
* India will have to place its civilian reactors under IAEA safeguards in perpetuity without such a fuel supply assurance;
* India will not have any assurance in piling fuel reserves for the lifetime of the reactors;
* Whatever corrective measures India may contemplate vis-à-vis fuel supply disruption, taking the reactors out of IAEA safeguards will be impermissible;
* India will not have access to full civilian nuclear technology;
* The consent to India's reprocessing of spent fuel is only notional;
* The US can terminate the 123 Agreement at will and stop all supplies immediately;
* India will have to align its foreign policy to that of the US, particularly on Iran.
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